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Abstract: Starting in 2007, Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) from Asia and 
the  Middle  East  have  invested  billions  of  dollars  in  major  U.S.  financial 
firms. The primary driving force behind their growth is rising commodity 
prices, in particular oil. Given that SWFs represent a relatively new, cash-
rich  investment  group,  we  studied  the  public  policy  concerns  with  their 
investments,  SWFs  mode  of  entry,  and  how  does  the  market  react  to  the 
investment.  SWFs  lack  of  transparency  with  regards  to  their  investment 
motives  and  governance  structure  is  cause  for  concern.  While  taking  full 
opportunity  of  depressed  security  prices  as  a  result  of  the  2007-2008 
financial crisis, they are also being prudent by investing mostly in preferred 
stocks and fixed-income convertible securities of large U.S. corporations that 
are  followed  by  many  analysts  and  are  highly  liquid.  Despite  investing 
handsomely  in  U.S.  targets  and  adopting  a  hands-off  approach  toward 
management; the liquidity crisis continues to perpetuate the decline in SWF-
targets’  stock  price  post-investment.  Using  an  event  study  parameter 
approach,  we  found  the  short-run  market  reaction  to  be  statistically 
insignificant in 11 out of 12 announcements of SWF investments; but in the 
months  following  the  investment,  SWF-targets  underperform  both  the 
S&P500 and the Dow Jones Financial Services Index Fund. 
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The U.S. public and federal regulators are taking a closer look at sovereign 
wealth funds (SWFs) as they invest generously in major U.S. firms, especially 
financial ones. Since 2007, SWFs from China, Dubai, Kuwait and Singapore have 
invested almost $50 billion in major U.S. financial firms like Citigroup, Merrill 
Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Bear Stearns (which has now been acquired by JPMorgan 
Chase), Blackstone Group, and Och-Ziff Capital Management Group (see Table 1). 
According to Morgan Stanley, SWFs today control more cash than the world’s 
hedge funds combined ($2.8 trillion vs. $1.7 trillion), and are expected to continue 
to grow.
1 Nonetheless, SWFs are generally regarded as “not transparent,” and the 
public  fears  that  these  foreign  government-owned  investment  funds  could 
potentially be used for geopolitical gains at the expense of the U.S. – a fear echoed 
by the SEC Chairman as well.
2
Most SWFs investing in the U.S. are based in Asia and the Middle East, and 
by investing in the U.S., they want to reduce their dependence on their traditional 
sources of export revenues. For example, by the late 1980s, the Kuwait government 
was earning more from overseas investments than oil sales, and the investment 
income served them well during the Gulf War and its aftermath.
3 However, many 
SWFs do not report or publish their objectives, accounts, and assets and this is a 
cause of concern for U.S. regulators and the American public. Given that SWFs 
represent a relatively new, cash-rich investment group, it is important to study their 
objectives (i.e., to understand why they are investing in the U.S.) and economic 
impact (i.e., how they can influence the U.S. financial markets). This intellectual 
inquiry motivates our paper. 
We focused specifically in this paper on the SWFs that made recent high-
profile investments in the U.S., since they are the subject of considerable interest to 
major financial firms, regulators and politicians. Due to their lack of reporting and 
their involvement in many privately-negotiated deals, it was also a challenge to 
collect complete and comprehensive data on SWFs.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section I, we define SWFs and 
list  their  motives  and  investment  strategies,  followed  by  Section  II,  which 
compares SWFs to other government-owned investment institutions. In Section III, 
we  present  a  model  for  valuing  SWFs  that  permits  us  to  understand  their 
investment behavior, and in Section IV we analyze the outstanding issues with 
SWFs.  We  evaluated  the  U.S.  stock  market  reaction  to  SWFs’  investment  in 
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SWF  transparency;  and,  in  Section  VII,  we  formulated  short-term  expectations 
about SWFs. We conclude in Section VIII. 
1. DEFINITION AND MOTIVES OF SWFS
While there is not a precise definition for SWFs, the following definition is a 
fairly comprehensive one: “SWFs are vehicles to manage public funds”:
4
x SWFs are predominantly engaged in cross-border investment seeking a higher 
risk-return  combination  than  the  one  offered  by  safer  investment  like 
government bonds.  
x SWFs obtain their capital mainly from foreign exchange reserves or current 
account surpluses.
x SWFs are controlled by their national government.  
Their possible investment motives include one or more of the following:  
x To invest their foreign exchange reserves or current account surpluses;
x To  diversify  their  asset  holdings  or  invest  in  assets  that  are  negatively 
correlated to their major exports (for example, some oil exporting nations want 
to diversify their nearly exclusive reliance on oil revenue; others want to limit 
the impact of volatile commodity prices and “smooth” revenue from exports);  
x To earn a higher rate-of-return than the one offered on safer investments, like 
Treasury Bonds;  
x To  accumulate  earnings  to  pay  future  obligations  (for  example,  pension 
obligations);
x To learn new skills and technology from developed nations and transfer them 
home; and  
x To influence foreign policies. 
Based on an interview with the chiefs of the Kuwait Investment Authority 
(KIA), Dubai International Capital (DIC), and Istithmar Fund (three SWFs from 
the Middle East) published in BusinessWeek (January 21, 2008), we garner that 
SWFs invest primarily in stocks and private equity of large U.S. firms. 
2. TYPES OF SWFS
SWFs can be classified as commodity versus non-commodity funds based on 
their sources of financing.
5 “Commodity SWFs” are funded by oil or commodity 
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official foreign exchange reserves. In that regard, most SWFs from the Middle East 
would be classified as oil “commodity SWFs,” while those from Asia would be 
classified as “non-commodity SWFs.” 
According  to  researchers,
6  SWFs  belong  to  a  continuum  of  sovereign 
investment vehicles that also includes central banks, sovereign stabilization funds, 
sovereign  saving  funds,  government  investment  corporations,  and  government-
owned  enterprises,  as  we  present  in  Figure  8.
7  SWFs  include  Sovereign 
Stabilization Funds (designed to stabilize revenue, for example, for an oil economy 
the fund accumulates cash when oil revenue is high, and provides funding when oil 
revenue  is  low),  Sovereign  Saving  Funds  (acts  as  intergenerational  funds  with 
excess revenue/reserve saved for future generations) and Government Investment 
Corporations (to invest in mid to high risk-return securities abroad). Unlike central 
banks, SWFs do not have the day-to-day responsibility for maintaining the stability 
of the national currency and money supply. Therefore, most SWFs can afford to 
lengthen  their  investment  horizon  and  assume  more  risk  with  the  objective  of 
earning high rates of return.  






  Shortest  Lowest  Lowest 
  Central Banks  Ļ Ļ Ļ
Sovereign Stabilization Funds  Ļ Ļ Ļ
Sovereign Saving Funds  Ļ Ļ Ļ
Sovereign
Wealth 
Funds  Government Investment Corporations  Ļ Ļ Ļ
  Government Owned Enterprises  Ļ Ļ Ļ
  Longest  Highest  Highest 
Figure 8 Types and Investment Characteristics of Sovereign Investment Vehicles
3. VALUATION OF SWFS
The Discounted Cash Flow analysis can be used to determine the value of 
SWFs. For example, consider a fund that invests all of its money in a project that 
pays cash flow CF every year for n number of years. The value of the fund is the 
present value of the CFs that it earns over the n number of years. The formula for 
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where CF represents cash flow, t is the year, n is the total number of years, 
and k  is  the  required  rate-of-return,  or  cost  of  capital.  Usually,  for  a  publicly 
incorporated fund, k is the weighted average cost of debt and equity. However, 
since they do not borrow money or sell stock to the public, there is neither a cost of 
debt nor a cost of equity for SWFs, and this allows them to charge a lower cost of 
capital to their investments.
Whether small or large, most private funds that borrow money face the risk 
of bankruptcy, and as a result, their cost of capital includes a premium for default 
risk. Usually, the higher the risk of default, the higher the default risk premium, 
and the higher the funds’ cost of capital. However, most SWFs do not borrow 
money and are backed by their government, so their cost of capital does not include 
a default risk premium
8, and this permits them to supply funds at a lower required 
rate-of-return than a private fund.
9
Referring back to Equation (1) and keeping CFt constant, a lower value for k
increases  the  present  value  of  the  expected  cash  flows.  This  makes  a  given 
investment more valuable to SWFs than to other funds and this could explain why 
SWFs invest in projects that are not likely to be accepted by funds that are financed 
with debt and equity. The fact that SWFs can accept a lower rate-of-return implies 
that they are more likely to provide financing during a financial crisis than funds 
that  are  financed  by debt  holders  and  stockholders.  For  example,  the  subprime 
mortgage crisis in late 2007 and early 2008 increased the cost of capital for many 
financial firms. Since the required rate-of-return for SWFs is generally lower than 
the  rate  charged  by  debt  holders  and/or  stockholders,  corporations  in  need  of 
financing  during  the  credit  crisis  turned  to  the  less  “costly”  SWFs  for  cash. 
Therefore,  recent  experience  suggests  that  the  SWFs  can  mitigate  the  adverse 
effects of a liquidity or credit crisis.  
On a larger scale, SWFs facilitate the global allocation of credit and capital 
from  countries  with  excess  capital  to  firms  that  need  capital.  And  not  only do 
SWFs improve access to capital for corporations, they can make it available at a 
lower rate (as explained above). This, in turn, potentially increases the value of the 
investment for which the financing is needed.
10 As a result, value is added to the 
SWF-financed  corporation.  Additionally,  SWFs  are  predominantly  passive 
investors  and  are  not  demanding  boardroom  changes  or  creating  management 
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Nonetheless, there are risks associated with SWFs. One potential risk with 
SWFs lies in the fact that so little is known about them. Even though a SWF may 
assert that it is passively investing for the long-run, a change in its government or 
policy may alter this investment stance for economic or geo-political reasons, and a 
new government may want to sell some or all of the investment. Some SWFs, for 
example the China Investment Corp and the Kuwait Investment Authority, faced 
domestic critics for recent losses on their investments, hence putting some pressure 
on their government to sell their investments.
11 If a SWF does ever decide to sell 
off  its  major  holdings,  the  sale  may  potentially  disrupt  the  market  in  the 
corporation’s securities. Next, SWFs are government-owned and managed by civil 
servants, so companies receiving SWF-financing have to deal with a new set of 
investor-bureaucrats. Moreover, equity investments by SWFs dilute the ownership 
of existing shareholders, hence reducing their claim on future cash flows.  
4. WHAT ARE THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES WITH SWFS?
People want to know more about the investment objectives of SWFs. Much 
of the concern has to do with the fact that many of the cash-rich SWFs are based in 
countries that may not always be friendly with the U.S. Among the concerns levied 
against SWFs are: (i) their perceived lack of transparency with regards to their 
operations, wealth and corporate governance structures;
12 (ii) the threat of a rival 
nation employing SWF capital to acquire strategic corporate assets and use them as 
a potential “weapon” against the U.S.; (iii) some SWFs adopt a non-traditional 
approach  to  investing.  For  example,  many  of  them  “bailed  out”  major  U.S. 
financial  firms  in  the  subprime  mortgage  crisis  of  2007-2008  when  traditional 
investors did not. Investors feared that the loss caused by the credit crisis would 
persist and they needed more time to determine the full extent of the crisis before 
they committed more funds; while SWFs, on the other hand, invested generously 
during  the  crisis;  and  (iv)  a  foreign  government  could  use  a  SWF  to  acquire 
proprietary knowledge, patented technology or trade secrets, and then transfer this 
knowledge  back  to  the  home  country.  According  to  researchers,  such  concerns 
about SWFs beg the question as to whether such investments are commercially-
motivated  or  politically-motivated.
13  We  summarized  more  of  the  outstanding 
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Figure 9 Issues with Sovereign Wealth Funds
5. MARKET REACTION TO SWFINVESTMENTS
To gauge the market reaction in the U.S. to investments by SWFs, we first 
identified the SWF investments that received the most media attention lately, by 
searching The Wall Street Journal, BusinessWeek, LexisNexis Academic and the 
SWF  Institute.
14  We  next  identified  the  specific  dates  of  the  first  public 
announcements of those investments. Our first goal was to measure the return on 
the announcement day as an indication of market reaction. A positive return would 
show signs of market enthusiasm and a negative return would indicate the opposite.  
Collecting  such  data  turns  out  to  be  challenging  because  there  is  not  a 
systematic way in which SWFs invest (see Table 1). Some SWFs buy U.S. stocks 
on  the  open  market.  Others  invest  in  preferred  stocks  that  are  convertible  into 
common  stock,  like  Korea  Investment  Corporation’s  $2  billion  investment  in 
Merrill Lynch convertible preferred stock, and Abu Dhabi Investment Authority’s 
$7.5  billion  investment  in  a  special  class  of  high-yielding  convertible  stock  in 
Citigroup.  
Some SWFs participate in secondary equity offerings (see examples in Table 
1, Panel C), while others participate in initial public offerings (see examples in 
Table 1, Panel D). We also observed cases where an investor sells stock directly to 
a SWF (for example, the U.S. based private-equity firm Arcapia sold its stake in 
Loehmann’s Holdings to Dubai’s Istithmar for $300 million in May 2006). Some 








What is their: 
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approach; (ii) 
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risk-management? 
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SWFs invest in private companies (for example, UAE’s Mubadala Fund paid $1.35 
billion in September 2006 for a 7.5 percent stake in private equity firm Carlyle 
Group). Other SWFs participate in joint ventures with private equity firms (for 
example, in 2007, Kuwait Investment Authority invested $300 million in Texas 
utility TXU alongside private equity firms KKR and TPG).  
Another problem obtaining complete data on SWFs is that not all announced 
deals  are  completed.  Either  the  SWF  opts  out  of  the  proposed  investment  (for 
example, China’s CITIC Securities Co. Ltd proposed investment in Bear Stearns in 
2007 was subsequently withdrawn) or the deal is not yet effective. 
For some SWF deals, the exact details on the amount invested or the stake 
purchased are not available, like Qatar Investment Authority’s acquisition of an 
undisclosed minority stake in Fortress Investment Group. In other cases, a revised 
deal is announced subsequent to the initial announcement. For example, in January 
2008, MGM Mirage made a revised offer to Dubai World by offering additional 
shares. In other cases, the proportion of equity purchased and the proportion of 
voting power are not equal, such as the case of the Chinese government purchasing 
a  9.9  percent  nonvoting  stake  in  Blackstone.  A  few  SWFs  invest  through  a 
subsidiary under a different name, for example, Singapore Government Investment 
Corporation’s  (SGIC)  stake  in  Syniverse  Holdings  Inc.,  is  also  owned  by  a 
subsidiary of SGIC named Snowlake Investment Pte Ltd. It is also the case that 
there are many funds from the UAE that are investing in the U.S. and it is not clear 
which ones are actually SWFs. Despite the challenges outlined above, we are able 
to identify 15 major SWF deals in 2007 and 2008 that we present in Table 12. 
A. Which SWFs Are Investing in the U.S.? 
In Table 12, we present various characteristics about the target firm and the 
SWF acquirer in 15 SWF deals. We observe that these major SWF investments in 
the  U.S.  started  in  the  second  half  of  2007  and  coincided  with  the  subprime 
mortgage crisis. In Panel A of Table 12 there are 12 target U.S. public corporations 
identified, and except for Advanced Micro Devices and MGM Mirage, all of them 
are financial corporations (i.e., investment advisors and/or security brokers and/or 
dealers) and most of them incurred major losses linked to the subprime mortgage 
crisis. All of the target firms are NYSE-listed, except for one NASDAQ listing, 
suggesting that SWFs prefer large-capitalization stocks that are frequently traded, 
and that benefit from increased investor recognition and enhanced liquidity. These 
large-cap stocks are also typically followed by many analysts and, compared to SHANGHAI,DUBAI,MUMBAI OR GOODBYE? 111
other stocks, would contain the least amount of asymmetric information. The only 
non-NYSE target company in Table 12, Panel A, is NASDAQ Stock Market Inc., 
which is yet another major large-cap company. Panel B of Table 12 presents three 
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) in which SWFs participated, and once again, we 
observe that the targets are major financial firms that are listed on the NYSE post-
IPO.
                                                     
1 Business Week, November 12, 2007.  
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Macro-Fiscal Linkages,” Working Paper, International Monetary Fund (2007.) 
5  R.  Kimmitt  (2008),  “Public  Footprints  in  Private  Markets,”  Foreign  Affairs,
January/February, pp. 119-130.  
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7 Central Banks have short investment horizons and invest mostly in risk-free assets, like 
U.S.  Treasury  bills.  Government-owned  enterprises  conduct  business,  such  as 
manufacturing, and face real business risks.  
8  There  is  one  exception.  The  Dubai  International  Capital’s  debt-to-equity  ratio  is 
approximately  4:1  (Business  Week,  January  21,  2008).  Its  lenders  include  HSBC, 
Barclays and RBS. 
9 This would not apply for Pension Reserve Funds. 
10 Further, SWFs that invest in convertible fixed-income securities provide additional value 
to corporations in the form of an interest tax shield because the fixed income paid to the 
SWFs is tax-deductible. 
11 Wall Street Journal, February 28 and March 31, 2008.  
12 This does not apply in the case of the SWF from Norway. 
13  J.  Aizenman  and  R.  Glick  (2007),  “Sovereign  Wealth  Funds:  Stumbling  Blocks  or 
Stepping  Stones  to  Financial  Globalization?”  Federal  Reserve  Bank  San  Francisco 
Economic Letter, December.  
14 The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (www.swfinstitute.org/aboutus.php) is an impartial 
organization  designed  to  study  Sovereign  Wealth  Funds  and  their  impact  on  global 
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In Table 12, Panels C and D, we present the Linaburg-Maduell transparency 
index, obtained from the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, for the SWFs investing 
in the U.S. The lowest rating (least transparent) a SWF can receive is a 1 and the 
highest  (most  transparent)  is  a  10.  The  Sovereign  Wealth  Fund  Institute 
recommends  a  minimum  transparency  rating  of  8  in  order  to  claim  adequate 
transparency. The mean and median transparency index for SWFs investing in the 
U.S. is 5, and most of them fail the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute’s transparency 
minimum. Among the least transparent, we found the Qatar Investment Authority 
(Index = 1), China Investment Corporation (Index = 2), Abu Dhabi Investment 
Authority (Index =3), and Mubadala Development Company (Index = 3). 
 With regards to the amount invested, we found that the largest investment 
occurred in November 2007 when Abu Dhabi Investment Authority invested $7.5 
billion  in  Citigroup  Inc.  The  second  highest  investment  was  Government  of 
Singapore Investment Corp.’s $6.88 billion investment in Citigroup Inc. in January 
2008. The investments presented in Panels C and D of Table 12 total to more than 
$42 billion, and the average SWF investment is close to $3.5 billion. 
Panel C of Table 12 shows that the most common form of transaction by 
SWFs is the purchase of convertible preferred securities, representing 6 out of the 12 
major  SWF  deals  in  2007-2008.  Since  most  of  the  SWF  investments  targeted 
financial  firms  and  occurred  during  the  U.S.  subprime  mortgage  crisis,  the  data 
suggests that SWFs adopt a prudent investment strategy in the sense that preferred 
stocks  and  other  fixed-income  securities  are  safer  investments  during  a  financial 
crisis, while common stocks are more sought-after during a bullish period. Most of 
the convertible preferred stocks issued to SWFs have mandatory conversion features 
within a few years (the most common conversion period occurs in three years). 
The ownership stakes purchased by SWFs were all less than 10 percent, 
except for the transaction between Nasdaq and Borse Dubai which was for a 19.99 
percent share (see Panels C and D of Table 1). In half of the 12 major transactions 
in Panel C of Table 12, the ownership stake purchased was less than five percent. 
In most cases, if a SWF (or any other investment group) holds more than five 
percent of a public company’s outstanding common stock, the investor would be 
considered a “block holder” and the company has to disclose it to the SEC in its 
Annual  Reports  and  Proxy  Statements.  An  investment  below  five  percent  also 
avoids  a  Federal  Reserve  investigation.  In  the  transaction  between  Nasdaq  and SHANGHAI,DUBAI,MUMBAI OR GOODBYE? 115
Borse Dubai, the voting rights of Borse Dubai are limited to 5 percent, even though 
it bought 19.99 percent of Nasdaq’s share capital.  
Although  there  are  some  advantages  to  minority  ownership,  it  is  not 
necessarily the case that all SWFs are buying minority stakes to evade regulations. 
A study by the consulting company Monitor Group reports that half of 420 equity 
investments by SWFs (for which it could trace the ownership interests) since 2000 
involved purchases of majority stakes.
1 Since we report a relatively large number 
of minority-stake acquisitions by SWFs of primarily convertible securities during a 
period of financial crisis (2007-2008), we cannot rule out the possibility that the 
recent minority-stake acquisitions were motivated more by a prudent and cautious 
investment strategy than by regulatory concerns. That is, the depressed security 
prices during a period of financial distress afforded the SWFs an opportunity to 
invest in the U.S. cheaply; however, the SWFs were wary of the consequences, 
and, consequently, invested in minority stakes. 
B. Stock Market Reaction to Announcements of SWF Investment 
Given the controversy about SWF investment in the U.S., we conducted an 
empirical  investigation  to  measure  the  market  reaction  to  the  announcement  of 
SWFs’ investments in U.S. target firms. Specifically, we attempted to answer the 
question: After controlling for the overall return on the market around the time of 
an announcement, do SWF investments have any significant impact, either positive 
or negative, on the stock returns of their targets? To answer this question, we used 
the event parameter approach whereby the market model is augmented by adding a 
dummy variable to identify the event period as follows: 
t mt t d R R H J E D      (2)
where t R  is the stock return on day t, mt R  is the return on the S&P500 on day t, d
is the Event Dummy that takes a value of 1 for the event window [-1,0,+1] and 0 
otherwise, where day 0 is the day the SWF investment is announced. The model 
was estimated using daily returns starting 30 days prior to the event day 0 and 
ending 30 days following the event day 0. The return on the S&P500 was used as a 
proxy for market return. Stock price data were collected from the Global Financial 
Database.  We  have  presented  the  results  in  Panel  A  of  Table  13. 
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Out  of  the  12  SWF  investments,  the  coefficient  of  the  event  dummy  is 
statistically  significant  at  conventional  levels  in  only  one  case,  that  of  Dubai 
World’s $5.2 billion investment in MGM Mirage. The latter is a casino giant and 
$2.7 billion of the investment would be used as a joint-venture in a major Las 
Vegas project. The investment was not related to the financial crisis in the U.S. 
during that period. It is possible that the expected costs due to financial distress 
weigh heavily on most of the target firms receiving SWF investments in 2007 and 
2008. According to the Signaling theory of capital structure, firms with uncertain 
prospect would be willing to sell equity to raise cash. Based on the Pecking Order 
Hypothesis, firms with limited retained earnings, few marketable securities, and 
exhausted borrowing capacity are most likely to sell convertible securities and/or 
common stock.  
In Panel B of Table 13, we analyzed the market reaction to IPOs in which 
SWFs participated. We measured the market reaction as the difference between the 
offer price to the SWF and the closing price on the first day of trading. Usually, the 
offer price is lower than the closing price. Underpricing would generally suggest 
market interest in an IPO. With underpricing averaging 12 percent starting in 2001 
(following the Internet bubble years), the IPO deals to China Investment Corp. 
(underpricing of 18 percent) and Kuwait Investment Authority (underpricing of 28 
percent) appear to be profitable ones.
1 Given that SWFs are actively looking for 
investments  in  large,  liquid,  well-known  organizations  that  trade  on  large 
exchanges,  the  marketing  efforts  and  costs  involved  in  selling  the  IPO  of 
Blackstone Group LLC and Visa Inc. to SWFs could be low.
2 As a result, the IPO 
firms were able to share some of the savings by offering lower offer prices to 
SWFs.
C.  Short-  to  Medium-term  Performance  of  Targets  Following  Investment  by 
SWFs
In  Table  14  we  present  the  short-  to  medium-term  stock  performance  of 
SWF targets. On average, the targets’ stock price performance is negative in the 
months following SWF investments. A “Buy and Hold Return” is also calculated 
as follows: 
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where BHRm is the Buy and Hold Return up to month m and Returnn is the 
return for month n. The results displayed in Table 14 show that the mean BHR is 
negative 7 percent for the first month, and decreases to negative 64 percent by the 
end of month 11. In other words, an investor, who buys the target firm’s stock upon 
announcement of the SWF investment, and holds it for the next 11 months, would 
lose 64 percent on her investment. The corresponding period mean BHR on the 
S&P500 in negative 21 percent. In Panel B of Table 14, we show the short- to 
medium-term performance of IPOs in which SWFs participate. The results suggest 
that, on average, the stock price performance is mostly negative in the months 
following  the  IPO.  The  average  BHR  for  the  12  months  following  the  IPO  is 
negative 16 percent. We also present corresponding returns on the S&P500 for 
comparison purposes. We observe that, on average, the target firms underperform 
the S&P500.
The above short- to medium-term underperformance suggests that, to many 
investors,  SWF  investments  do  not  improve  the  firm’s  outlook.  Most  SWF 
investments between mid-2007 and early-2008 were in financial firms, and that 
period coincides with the subprime mortgage crisis that continues to negatively 
affect financial firms in the U.S. today. The period also coincides with a negative 
outlook  for  the  U.S.  economy.  It  appears  that  investors  do  not  believe  that 
investments  from  SWFs  were  sufficient  to  overturn  the  negative  effects  of  the 
credit crunch and a depressed economy.  
In his speech at the American Enterprise Legal Center for the Public Interest
on December 5, 2007, the SEC Chairman Christopher Cox noted that: “If ordinary 
investors … come to believe that they are at an information disadvantage when 
they  compete  head-to-head  in  markets  with  governments,  confidence  …  could 
collapse…” The negative stock price performance following investments by SWFs 
would seem to support the Chairman’s observation. 
                                                     
1 T. Loughran and J. Ritter, “Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time,” Financial 
Management, Vol. 33, pp. 5-37, (2004). 
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VI. THEGOVERNANCE STRUCTURE FOR SWFS IN THE U.S. 
Given  that  SWFs  are  government-owned,  their  political  risks  cannot  be 
discounted. However, the U.S. has no interest in turning them away. The U.S. 
Treasury acknowledges that SWFs have helped to stabilize financial companies 
reeling from the subprime mortgage debacle.
1 In this section, we consider how 
existing measures can lessen some of the concerns associated with SWFs. First, the 
U.S. President has the authority to block any M&A deal that represents a threat to 
national security under the “Exon-Florio Amendment.” Second, the Amendment 
also  establishes  the  U.S.  Committee  on  Foreign  Investment,  which  advises  the 
President to block any foreign investment that poses a threat to national security. 
The presence of this Committee served as a threat to China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation’s attempt to acquire Unocal.
2 The bid had to be aborted because of its 
political ramifications. Third, the U.S. Department of Treasury is working with 
SWFs to formulate governance-principles including: (i) SWF investments should 
be commercially-motivated, (ii) SWFs should disclose purpose and objectives, (iii) 
SWFs should install governance structures, internal controls, and risk management 
systems, (iv) SWFs should compete fairly with the private sector, and (v) SWFs 
should comply with host-country regulatory and disclosure requirements.
3
Some researchers argue that the World Trade Organizaton (WTO) and the 
International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  can  work  together  in  monitoring  SWFs.
4
Others  suggest  that  a  vote  suspension  for  SWF  equity  investments  will  allay 
political  fears.
5  At  the  international  level,  the  IMF  is  taking  a  lead  role  in 
identifying best practices for SWFs in areas like governance, transparency, and 
accountability (see Badian and Harrington).
6 Establishing an IMF-led code of best 
corporate governance practices will offer an international “baseline” of responsible 
SWF managerial practices; yet it will be voluntary in nature. 
VII.  THEOUTLOOK FOR SWFS
The primary driving force behind the growth in SWFs is the increase in 
commodity prices, in particular oil. As Figure 10 demonstrates, high oil prices have 
given oil-exporting countries (also referred to as the Petro Power) new financial 
heft.
7 Hence, SWFs are primed to promote the international flow of capital.
Lately, the Petro Power has been targeting U.S. firms, especially big ones.
8 It 
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governance,  shareholder  rights,  and  financial  regulations,  and  will  therefore 
continue to show a preference for big U.S. corporations. 
Figure 10 The Wealth Power of Oil-producing Nations
Source: Gerald F. Seib, “Pump-Price Shock Blurs National Security Issue,” The Wall Street Journal,
July 8, 2008, p. A2. Reproduced with permission from Gerald F. Seib. [Insert Figure 3 here] 
La  Porta  et  al.  show  how  investors  prefer  markets  that  provide  better 
protection for their rights.
9 Institutional investors around the world prefer to invest 
in stocks of large firms (to mitigate concerns about liquidity and transaction costs) 
that  are  located  in  markets  with  high  disclosure.
10  In  particular,  non-U.S. 
institutional investors prefer to invest in stocks that comprise the MSCI World 
Index (a leading index used in international asset management). Such stocks have 
worldwide recognition and are followed by many analysts. Furthermore, foreign 
institutions prefer non-dividend paying stocks perhaps because of tax withholding 
concerns,
11 and Warnock and Cai find that foreign institutional investors prefer 
U.S. firms with global operations.
12
Using  the  Ferreira  and  Matos  classification  of  institutional  owners,  we 
classify  SWFs  as  “Grey  Institutional”  owners,  alongside  bank  trusts,  insurance 
companies, pension funds and endowments. Grey Institutional owners tend to be 
passive (unlike independent institutional owners that include mutual fund managers SHANGHAI,DUBAI,MUMBAI OR GOODBYE? 123
and investment advisers) and are less likely to react when management actions are 
not necessarily maximizing shareholders’ wealth.
13 We also note that some SWFs 
are investing to gain access to new skills and technology. For example, the Dubai 
Group invested in NASDAQ, partly so that NASDAQ could take a stake in the 




Since  the  summer  of  2007,  Middle  East  and  Asian  SWFs  have  received 
heightened media attention and public policy scrutiny in the U.S., since they have 
been involved in the purchase of minority equity positions in major U.S. public 
corporations. These concerns arise because of a perceived lack of transparency of 
SWF operations and their corporate governance structures, and the fear that a rival 
nation could use SWF capital to acquire strategic corporate assets and turn them 
into geo-political “weapons” against the host country. However, the controversial 
issues of SWF transparency and corporate governance are being actively addressed 
by the U.S. government and international economic and finance organizations. 
In this paper, we argue that SWFs can supply funds at a lower required rate-
of-return compared to non-government-owned funds. This, in turn, increases the 
net worth of the projects for which the investments were sought. Moreover, recent 
experience in the U.S. suggests that SWFs can mitigate the adverse effects of a 
liquidity  crisis.  While  depressed  security  prices  during  a  liquidity  crisis  afford 
SWFs an opportunity to invest cheaply, they adopt a prudent approach by investing 
in  minority  stakes  and/or  preferred  stocks  and/or  fixed  income  convertible 
securities. On a larger scale, SWFs facilitate the global allocation of capital from 
countries with excess capital to firms that need the capital. 
We also focus on two empirical questions of research interest. First, how 
does the market react to announcements of SWF investment in U.S. companies? 
Second, what is the short- to medium-term performance of these companies post-
SWF investment? We run an event study parameter approach whereby the market 
model  is  augmented  by  a  dummy  variable  representing  the  announcement  to 
answer the first question, and we calculate short- to medium-term buy-and-hold 
returns to answer the second question. The statistical results show that the market 
reaction is statistically insignificant in 11 out of 12 cases during an event window 
that includes the day prior to, the day, and the day following the announcement of a Surendranath JORY, Mark PERRY, Thomas A. HEMPHILL  124
SWF  investment.  We  also  find  that  in  the  eleven  months  following  an  SWF 
investment,  the  target’s  stock  price  declines  by  63.77  percent  on  average,  and 
underperforms both the S&P500 (-21.49 percent) and the Dow Jones Financial 
Services Index Fund (-42.85 percent) over the corresponding period. Therefore, 
SWF investments did not halt the downturn in the target financial firm’s stock 
price caused by the U.S. liquidity crisis in 2007-2008.  
                                                     
1 Wall Street Journal, June 06, 2008. 
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